INTRODUCTION
Lawyers who oversee law school administration seem to flout antitrust law, which is somewhat ironic. A few years ago, the American Bar Association ("ABA") settled a government lawsuit alleging that its law school accreditation procedures collusively increased faculty salaries.' The Justice Department maintained that an ABA rule requiring each law school's faculty compensation to be comparable to that of other ABAapproved law schools "restrained competition among professional personnel at ABA-approved law schools" and "had the effect of ratcheting up law school salaries." 2 This Essay examines a current practice, recommended by the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS"), which artificially suppresses faculty salaries.
Shortly before classes start for an academic year, an aggressive faculty member might like to approach his or her dean and threaten to resign, and perhaps teach elsewhere, unless his or her salary is increased. Law school deans might dislike this strategy for a number of reasons. It would increase some salaries. It might increase transaction costs, because addressing problems at the last minute may not be as efficient as following a planned process. It also might foster dissension among faculty members, for those whose teaching responsibilities could easily be covered (or lost) might receive relatively lower compensation.
The law schools might, therefore, seek to limit professors' bargaining power by agreeing not to engage in the sort of competition that would drive up faculty salaries. A statement issued by the AALS identifies such a process. The statement memorializes an expectation that law schools generally will not extend offers of indefinite employment to No. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596, 611-13 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 37b (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 109-1, Jan. 7, 2005) ) (confirming federal and state antitrust laws do not prohibit conduct of graduate medical education residency matching program).
ABA Consent Decree, supra note 1, at 39, 424-25. sitting law professors after March 1. 3 This Essay analyzes the antitrust implications of the arrangement memorialized in the AALS statement. We find the issue interesting for three reasons: First, one would have expected the recent settlement of the ABA antitrust litigation regarding accreditation procedures to have focused attention on the antitrust implications of other aspects of law school administration.
The continuation of this hiring policy is, therefore, curious. Second, the AALS statement reflects an arrangement among buyers, for law schools purchase teaching services from faculty members. Antitrust challenges to potentially collusive arrangements among buyers are increasingly common, and this apparent agreement among law schools provides an interesting context in which to examine buyer arrangements. Finally, we find it interesting that the arrangement in question was promulgated by an organization of legal educators. That fact says something about the ease with which sophisticated persons can (one supposes inadvertently) create serious antitrust problems.
The purpose of this Essay is merely to examine the pertinent antitrust issues. The Essay proceeds on the assumption that the AALS policy, whose terms are precatory, 5 speaks to what is in fact an agreement among law schools. As noted below, the policy itself contemplates that law school deans will seek waivers, in individual cases, extending the time periods for up to two months. Were the policy to be litigated, law schools might dispute the existence of an agreement. We believe, though, that the nature of the policy strongly suggests that it represents an agreement among law schools and that any litigation would yield consistent evidence. Nothing in our individual experiences as faculty members suggests otherwise. Reviewing the policy on that basis, we ' See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. The statement further provides that offers for visiting positions must be extended by March 15, and it recommends that faculty members not resign to accept another indefinite (nonvisiting) law school teaching position later than March 15. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001 ) (denying motion to dismiss antitrust action based on purported collusion among employers); John R. Wilke, How Driving Prices Lower Can Violate Antitrust Statutes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at Al (reporting on growth in number of antitrust lawsuits based on monopsony and buyer collusion).
' See infra text accompanying note 10. 6 To the extent law schools follow the policy, one could infer an agreement among compliant law schools, for compliance with the policy (i.e., refusing to extend an offer to a competitor's employee after a certain date) would be economically irrational for a law school acting unilaterally. Such behavior would make economic sense only if there were an agreement among the competing law schools to abide by the same policy. As such, in litigation, the law schools' consciously parallel behavior would give rise to an inference of agreement for purposes of the antitrust laws. Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939) (holding that consciously parallel behavior among competing movie conclude that the policy violates federal antitrust law.
I. THE AALS STATEMENT
The AALS is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the "improvement of the legal profession through legal education." 7 The members of the corporation include 166 law schools.
8
In 1979, the Executive Committee of the AALS 9 adopted a Statement of Good Practices for the Recruitment and Resignation by Full-Time Faculty Members, which (as revised in 1984 and 1986) states:
Offer of Appointment. To permit a full-time faculty member to give due consideration to an offer and timely notice of resignation or request for leave of absence to his or her law school, a law school should make an offer of an indefinite appointment as a teacher during the following academic year no later than March 1 and of a visiting appointment no later than March 15.
Resignation or Request for Leave of Absence. A full-time faculty member should not resign to accept an indefinite appointment as a teacher at another law school during the next academic year later than March 15 nor request leave of absence to accept a visiting appointment as a teacher later than April 1. A law school should not offer an indefinite appointment or visiting position that contemplates that the faculty member resign or request leave of absence at a later date.
Consent of the Dean of the Law School. Even if the dean of the law school on whose faculty the person serves has acquiesced, a law school should not make an offer of an appointment as a teacher to a full-time member of the faculty of a law school more than two months later than the dates stated above and the faculty member distributors implied agreement because behavior at issue made economic sense only if all parties acted in concert). ' Since 1977, the AALS's Bylaws have provided for an Executive Committee consisting of nine members. AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 11. The Committee is comprised of six faculty members of AALS-member law schools, who are elected at annual meetings on staggered three-year terms, and the three officers of the AALS, who are also on the faculty of AALS-member law schools. AALS Bylaws, supra note 7, § § 4-1, 5-1.a, 5-1.b.
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should not resign or re uest leave of absence two months later than the dates stated above.
The policy indicates that its purpose is to give the institution sufficient time to arrange a replacement for a departing professor, and that it is designed to "serve the best interests" of both the school a professor is leaving and the school to which the professor is moving. Interestingly, the policy does not purport to limit retirements after March 15 or postMarch 15 resignations to take positions outside law school teaching. The disruption occasioned by such departures would, of course, be the same. The exclusion of recommendations regarding forms of departure other than those regulated by the policy is consistent with the view that the arrangement is designed to inhibit competition among law schools for incumbent faculty members (although one might argue that this limitation reflects other factors, e.g., the infrequency of departures for other reasons).12 1O AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 93-94. The policy does not purport to be binding. The policy states that the AALS "urges" that the practices be followed and states that the timeframes are "to provide those who wish to proceed responsibly a guide to appropriate conduct." Id. at 93. Although the AALS's bylaws contemplate that law schools may be censured or excluded from membership for material failures to comply with obligations of membership, AALS Bylaws, supra note 7, § 7-1, the bylaws provide that statements of policy and regulations "are not meant to be taken as implying ... that departure from any of their specific terms is automatically demonstrative of qualitative failure." AALS Bylaws, supra note 7, § 2-2. (last visited March 16, 2005 ) ("Faculty members may terminate their appointments effective at the end of an academic year, provided that they give notice in writing at the earliest possible opportunity, but not later than May 15, or thirty days after receiving notification of the terms of appointment for the coming year, whichever date occurs later.").
AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 93. 2 One might wonder whether the AALS is, in fact, a captive of law professors and, therefore, this policy memorializes some form of ethical statement among law professors (not law schools). That the policy does not limit late retirements to go into law practice is consistent with the notion that the policy is not the product of an agreement among law professors acting as law professors.
A separate AALS policy, however, could be more easily characterized in that way. Three years after this Statement was last amended, a different Statement was adopted addressing, inter alia, the timing of notice of a faculty member's resignation to "assume another position," taking a leave of absence to teach, and assumption of "a temporary position in practice or government." Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, in AALS HANDBOOK, supra
The simplicity of the AALS Statement belies the intricacy of mutual assent to academic employment contracts. At some institutions, the initial written agreements setting forth salary terms may condition the institution's acceptance on approval by the university system's board of regents." It would be inaccurate, then, to consider academic institutions as universally helpless economic actors otherwise powerless when confronted by last-minute negotiation by individual faculty members.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE AALS STATEMENT
By its terms, section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements in restraint of trade.
14 Recognizing that a literal interpretation of the statute would condemn practically all commercial contracts, courts have interpreted the provision to preclude only unreasonable restraints of trade." Specifically, section 1 creates liability where: (i) two or more economic actors1
6 have entered an agreement; (ii) that agreement unreasonably restrains trade or commerce; and (iii) the restraint affects interstate commerce. Two other matters, pertinent to any actual litigation, merit mention. First, were a professor to bring a private action seeking damages, the plaintiff would be required to prove an injury stemming from the anticompetitive aspects of the policy. Id. § 3.04 [1] . That might be difficult to prove.
Second, particular defendants might assert immunity under the state action doctrine, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) element is easily satisfied, for law professors are recruited on a nationwide basis (frequently, at the AALS's own Faculty Recruitment Conference or through its national Placement Bulletin), and any practice that affects the hiring of law faculty thus has an effect on interstate commerce. 8 We assume that the first requirement is satisfied, for the AALS statement appears to memorialize an existing agreement among the law schools.' 9 Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the second element -whether the law schools' concerted restriction on the time period in which lateral offers of employment may be extended constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.
A threshold inquiry is whether "trade or commerce" is involved at all. After all, the parties to the agreement are nonprofit educational institutions, not profit-seeking businesses. 20 the activities of a nonprofit entity are exempt from section 1 when they represent "the antithesis of commercial activity,"22 the setting of employees' salaries is commercial by nature and, therefore, is not an exempt activity. 2 Accordingly, the agreement at issue involves trade or commerce.
The key question is whether the agreement unreasonably restrains trade or commerce. To answer that question, a reviewing court would employ one of three modes of analysis, depending on the nature of the agreement. For some types of agreements, courts simily presume unreasonableness and declare the agreements illegal per se. Such per se illegal agreements are those "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality."2'
Included in this category are naked agreements 26 to fix prices or reduce output, agreements involving "bidrigging," horizontal market divisions, group boycotts, vertical agreements maintaining resale prices, and certain agreements involving tying and reciprocal dealing. If an agreement falls within one of the per se illegal categories, then "(a) neither a relevant market nor an estimate of the defendants' market power must be established to prove that the restraint is unlawful; (b) harmful effects arepresumed; and (c) the range of permissible defenses is severely limited."
Given the per se rule's restricted inquiry, and the consequent possibility that a court may mistakenly condemn a procompetitive practice without affording the defendant an opportunity to present a full defense, the rule's scope is narrow.i
Most types of agreements challenged under section 1 are afforded a significantly more searching Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 665.
Cf. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998 1, 5 (1958) ("[T] here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.").
' Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) . 16 A "naked" (or "nearly naked") buyers' cartel is one "where the only or principal purpose of the agreement is to fix the buying price or output and where the challenged restraint cannot be said to be ancillary to a significant integration of the firms' operations." 
S. at 692 (describing Rule of Reason inquiry). Justice Brandeis described the Rule of Reason inquiry as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences. would be deemed unreasonable -and thus illegal -under either a "quick look" or Rule of Reason inquiry.
A. Is the Agreement Illegal Per Se?
An argument can be made that the agreement reflected in the AALS Statement is per se illegal. The net effect of the agreement is that each member law school, after the March 1 deadline, is granted the exclusive right to bid for the professors on its faculty without worrying about competing bids from rival law schools. The agreement thus resembles a form of naked horizontal market division, which, as a general 37 proposition, would be illegal per se.
A reviewing court, however, would probably refuse to invoke the per se rule here. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to agply the per se rule to practices with which it has had little experience. Because the restraint in the AALS Statement represents a somewhat novel arrangement, a court considering the restraint's legality would probably find per se treatment inappropriate. Moreover, a reviewing court might be reluctant to apply the per se rule in an otherwise appropriate context simply because the parties are nonprofit educational institutions.4o
(recognizing "the distinction between the per se rule and the rule of reason as soft rather than hard").
3 The authors of the leading antitrust treatise have opined that similar agreementsthe so-called "reserve clauses" in professional sports contracts -should be considered per se illegal:
Under the reserve clauses, the teams in a certain league or association agree not to bid against one another for certain classes of players. For example, a player's contract with Team X may provide that for one year after the initial contract expires Team X will have a preemptive right to keep the player for an additional year at the same salary. Such agreements are generally unlawful per se, but for the fact that most qualify for the antitrust labor immunity when negotiated as part of a collective bargaining process. , 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993 ) (refraining from declaring agreement among Ivy League institutions per se illegal because parties to agreement were charitable educational organizations with "alleged pure altruistic motive" and no apparent "revenue maximizing purpose").
B. "Quick Look"
If the arrangement were not categorized as a per se violation, it ultimately would be deemed unreasonable under one of the more probing modes of analysis. Most likely, a court would condemn the restraint using the truncated "quick look" analysis, because even a cursory review identifies the anticompetitive effect.
Under the quick look analysis, as under the full-scale Rule of Reason, the outcome-determinative question is whether the practice at issue decreases or increases competition in the relevant market; courts are not permitted to question whether competition in that market is reasonable or desirable.
'
Given this focused inquiry, the restraint in the AALS Statement could not pass muster, for any observer with a basic understanding of economics would conclude that the restraint reduces competition in the market for law professors.
42
Most obviously, the restraint diminishes competition by artificially reducing the number of lateral employment offers that are extended. For example, a law school that receives or confirms funding for an academic "line" (position) after March 1 may not unilaterally seek to fill the position with an experienced professor. 43 A reduction in lateral offers reduces competition and, thus, artificially lowers prices for the services of experienced law professors.
In addition, the restraint diminishes competition and artificially suppresses salaries in a more subtle way. Some set of law schools will have retained discretion after March 1 to decide whether to renew contracts and to fix the terms of compensation they propose to offer professors. The restraint in the AALS Statement thus limits the ability of faculty members to bargain as to the terms of their employment, by eliminating options that otherwise would be available when terms of employment may be finalized. It takes no more than "a rudimentary " Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (stating that, regardless of analytical approach employed, "the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry... that policy decision has been made by the Congress").
42 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (noting that condemnation under quick look is appropriate where "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets"). 43 Under the terms of the AALS Statement, the law school could extend a lateral offer between March 1 and May 1, but only if it first procured the consent of the offeree's incumbent dean. After May 1, a lateral offer would be prohibited even if the incumbent dean consented. See AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 94. understanding of economics" to recognize that compliance with the policy will reduce the number of lateral offers ultimately extended, will impair a sitting law professor's ability to bargain as to the terms of employment, will artificially preclude law professors from receiving full value for their services, and will, thus, reduce the quantity or quality of teaching services brought to market. Therefore, the AALS restraint would probably be condemned under a quick look analysis.
C. Rule of Reason,
Were a court to decide that neither the per se rule nor the quick look analysis is properly applied here, it would apply the Rule of Reason. In a Rule of Reason analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the restraint has a substantially adverse effect on competition." Once the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the allegedly wrongful conduct. 45 If the defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff must then prove that the challenged restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.4 Applied to the AALS restraint, this three-step analysis would reveal that the agreement is unreasonable and, thus, illegal.
Substantially Adverse Effect on Competition
The above discussion of the quick look analysis explains why the AALS restraint has a substantially adverse effect on competition. A fullscale Rule of Reason inquiry would reveal the same anticompetitive effect -albeit via a more complicated analysis.
Ordinarily, a basic difference between the quick look and a full-scale Rule of Reason analysis is that the latter involves definition of the relevant market. This fact-intensive inquiry is undertaken not because proof of the relevant market is an end in itself, but because determining the relevant market helps identify the impact that the challenged In a case involving an agreement among employers affecting employment, market definition turns on the interchangeability, from the perspective of an employee, of various jobs. Where there are few substitutes for certain employment opportunities, those jobs constitute a relevant market (and where there are available substitutes, the market must be expanded to include the most substitutable positions).4 Applied to this particular case, the issue is the degree to which a slight decrease in professor salaries at AALS law schools would cause professors to quit their jobs. Given that there are few suitable substitutes for law-teaching jobs at AALS law schools, it is highly likely that a modest collusive salary reduction among the AALS members would generate little quitting by professors. Thus, a court would likely conclude that the relevant market is comprised of teaching positions at AALS law schools.i°O nce the relevant market is defined, the focus shifts to the effect of the restraint on competition within that market. As explained above, the restraint at issue artificially reduces the number of available teaching positions in the market, which means that professors must compete harder -generally, by lowering their salary requirements -for the reduced supply. The restraint also affects the ability of professors to negotiate. Ultimately, these factors will result in lower faculty salaries, which will dissuade individuals who might otherwise provide teaching services from doing so and will lead to an inefficient allocation of productive resources.
The AALS and member schools may argue that the restraint causes no consumer harm because it does not reduce the number of students graduated or credit hours taught. Of course, this "no output reduction" argument fails to the extent that the decrease in lateral hiring prevents law schools from expanding course offerings. Moreover, the argument fails because professor quality 51 is a relevant measure of output and will diminish as salaries are artificially suppressed by the AALS restraint.1 2 " See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001 ) ("At issue is the interchangeability, from the perspective of a [managerial, professional, and technical] employee, of a job opportunity in the oil industry with, for example, one in the pharmaceutical industry.").
49 Cf. id. at 204.
5'
We won't quibble about whether the smattering of non-AALS law schools is part of the relevant market.
For example, their understanding of antitrust. 52 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990) ("[Tlhe Thus, the restraint has an anticompetitive effect even if it does not reduce the number of law school graduates or the number of credit hours taught.
No Procompetitive Virtues
Confronted with the significant anticompetitive effects occasioned by the restraint at issue, the AALS and its member institutions would seek to prove offsetting procompetitive benefits, but their attempt would fail.
Reduced Disruption. The AALS Statement itself states that a rationale for the restraint is that it avoids educational disruption.
5 3 The mere fact that untimely faculty departures create problems for the law schools losing professors, however, cannot justify the AALS restraint. Because a competitor law school will be willing to pay more than an incumbent where the competitor is able to make better use of the input (i.e., the professor at issue), free competition for sitting faculty facilitates an optimal distribution of teaching resources. To say that rivals may agree not to compete because the "loser" would face difficulties is to say that competition itself may be limited because it is unreasonable. This is precisely the sort of "ruinous competition" argument that the Supreme Court has rejected time and again. Indeed, in Professional Engineers, the Court called this sort of argument "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." 5 5 The Court rejected an agreement 'Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.' This judgment 'recognizes that all elements of a bargain -quality, service, safety, and durability -and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers."') (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) ); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 , 1022 (10th Cir. 1998 ) (holding that anticompetitive harm resulted when salary caps reduced coaches' "incentive to improve their performance"). 5 The Statement explains:
[Tihe departure of a full-time law teacher always requires changes at the law school. Unless the school is given sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements to find another to offer the instruction given by the departing teacher, the reasonable expectations of students will be frustrated and the school's educational program otherwise disrupted.
AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 93.
' See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (refusing to credit "the age-old cry of ruinous competition" as justification for agreement to limit price competition). See generally 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, 2015c ("In Socony the Supreme Court categorically rejected the proposition that firms acting as buyers should be permitted to collude in order to stabilize fluctuating or erratic markets.").
See Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
designed to protect public safety because the purported safety benefits were created by limiting competition among rivals. The Court explained that, "[elven assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad." 56 Thus, because "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable, 57 the AALS restraint cannot be justified on the ground that it protects law schools against the harm resulting from losing the competition for a sitting law professor.
Lower Costs of Education. The AALS and member law schools might attempt to argue that the restraint at issue prevents bidding wars for professors and, therefore, increases output by lowering the cost of legal education. Cost-cutting by itself, however, is not a valid procompetitive justification; if it were, any group of competing buyers could immunize itself from liability stemming from any maximum price-fixing agreement. 58 From the standpoint of allocative efficiency, buyer agreements that reduce competition and depress prices are just as anticompetitive as seller agreements that artificially raise prices, and they should be judged the same. Both types of agreements lead to an inefficient allocation of productive resources. 9 Buyer agreements that depress prices ultimately rob the sellers of the normal fruits of their enterprises and, thus, reduce sellers' incentives to improve their products and increase output. 6 0 To the extent the restraint at issue here decreases competition for law professors and depresses professor See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 , 1022 (10th Cir. 1998 ; 12 HOVENKAM, supra note 26, 2013c (stating, as to motion picture "split" agreements, "[hlere as elsewhere in the law of buyer's cartels, collusion is not justified by the assertion that the split agreement enables theaters to obtain motion pictures at lower prices, and thus enables them to sell movie tickets or provide other services at lower prices.").
"9 See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY 36-61 (1993) The AALS and member law schools might, therefore, try to justify the restraint at issue as a means of circumventing the supracompetitive salaries resulting from the improper conduct of others in the salary-setting process. Of course, that should not give rise to a current defense -the ABA antitrust litigation was settled in 1996. 73 Moreover, the preeminent treatise indicates that the existence of a seller's cartel should not give rise to a defense to a challenge in a buyer's cartel. 
Less Restrictive Means Available
Even if a court were to credit one of these purportedly procompetitive justifications for the AALS restraint, the restraint would still be unreasonable, and thus illegal, because its ends could be achieved in a less restrictive manner.
7 5 Any law school concerned about untimely 70 The rule in Board of Trade had the effect of forcing all price bidding into the public market, so as to increase the efficiency of that market. See Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239 ("The rule made it to their interest to attend the Call; and if they did not fill their wants by purchases there, to make the final bid high enough to enable them to purchase from country dealers."). As there is no centralized public market for law professors, the AALS restraint can provide no similar benefits.
" See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 (stating that certain horizontal restraints are necessary to create college football); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (stating that horizontal restraints are necessary for creation of blanket music licenses, which otherwise would not have been available); Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (stating that horizontal price agreement was necessary to facilitate output-enhancing joint marketing arrangement among coal manufacturers); Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239-40 (stating that restraint is necessary to create efficient public market in "to arrive" grain).
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 1505 (2000) ("An apparently anticompetitive restraint can be departures could protect itself through unilateral action. For example, it might negotiate contract terms with faculty members specifying reasonable liquida ed damages professors must pay if they depart before a certain date (which would be determined by the law school individually, based on its own assessment of its planning process). Alternatively, a law school set to lose a professor could negotiate for the departing faculty member to teach in the following term for an agreedupon fee on a schedule that accommodated simultaneous appointments at two institutions. 76 Either approach would accommodate legitimate concerns less restrictively than the restraint reflected in the AALS Statement. Accordingly, the restraint is unreasonable and, thus, illegal.
CONCLUSION
The long-standing AALS Statement of Good Practices concerning the timing of appointments to faculty positions, to the extent that it memorializes an agreement among member law schools, represents a violation of federal antitrust law. The effect of such an agreement is to reduce the number of positions available to faculty members and to inhibit professors in bargaining for compensation. Antitrust law would not justify this arrangement as an attempt to offset the power of a competing cartel that might operate to inflate professor salaries.
The preceding discussion is confined to examining the antitrust implications of the arrangements memorialized in the AALS Statement. Yet, at least in some quarters, a piece of legal scholarship seems to be viewed as incomplete unless it has some sort of proposal, even one that is wildly impracticable or unrealistic. In the spirit of complying with that norm, we propose (or, more precisely, the one of us who does not teach antitrust, and is unlikely to be viewed as part of a cartel of antitrust professors, proposes) inclusion of a mandatory antitrust component somewhere in legal education or testing.
redeemed only if reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate objective. To be reasonably necessary, the restraint must not only promote the legitimate objective but must also do so significantly better than the available less restrictive alternatives.").
76 Presumably it is the short-term loss of teaching services, and not research, that is the legitimate concern of the incumbent employer.
